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長篇英語文章帶翻譯篇一
Britain Measuring poverty
英國 衡量貧困
The end of the line
貧困終止
The government sets out to redefine what it means to be poor
政府著手重新定義貧窮
When Seebohm Rowntree, a chocolate-maker and pioneering social researcher, beganmeasuring poverty in York in 1899, he worked out the minimum needed to buy enough foodfor “physical efficiency”. In 1935, when he repeated the study, Rowntree added allowances forcigarettes, newspapers and a holiday. By 1951 he concluded that poverty was on its waytowards being eradicated, with only pockets among the elderly left, and stopped counting.
1899年，當巧克力制造商和社會學家先驅(qū)的西伯姆·朗特里(Seebohm Rowntree)在約克(York)開始測量貧困，他提出了“最低溫飽線”的理論。在1935年，在反復研究之后，他又推行了關(guān)于香煙，報紙以及假期的補貼制度。并在1951年的時候，他得出結(jié)論，稱除了部分老人外，若按此方法進行下去將會貧困將會得到消除，因此他停下了研究的腳步。
Few now experience the raw penury of Rowntree’s day. But measuring poverty remains anobsession. In its dying days the last Labour government passed a law committing itssuccessors to reduce child poverty. That is causing trouble for the present lot. Under the law,poverty is defined primarily in relative terms: families with less than 60% of the median incomeare considered to be poor. On November 15th Iain Duncan Smith, the welfare secretary, wasset to launch a consultation to come up with a better definition. He wants to include thingsthat he regards as the real causes of want: worklessness, educational failure and drug andalcohol dependency.
現(xiàn)在很少有人能體驗到朗特里時代的貧困。但是測衡貧困至今仍是個謎題。在上一屆工黨最后的執(zhí)政日子里，通過了一項關(guān)于他們下屆將會減少兒童貧困的法案。這對當下執(zhí)政者造成了許多困擾。根據(jù)這項法律，貧窮的定義是相當于而言的：當家庭的收入低于收入中位數(shù)(median income)的60%時，即被認為是貧困。在11月15日，福利大臣伊恩·鄧肯·史密斯(Iain Duncan Smith)著手組織咨詢討論，為其尋找一個更好的定義。他希望能把他認為真正導致貧困的原因加入進去即失業(yè)，輟學，吸毒以及酗酒。
There are several problems with the current measure. Because it is relative, it is influenced bychanges in overall earnings. Figures released over the summer showed a sharp reduction inchild poverty over the last year—mostly the result of falling median incomes rather than agenuine improvement. The measure fails to take into account the quality of services thatthe poor receive, such as education and health. Worst of all, from the point of view of a cash-strapped government, huge amounts of money must be spent on tax credits and other welfareprogrammes to raise family incomes up to the threshold.
目前貧困的標準存在幾個問題。因為該標準屬于相對標準，受整體收入變動的影響。如夏季公布的圖表所示，與去年全年相比，今年同期的兒童貧困數(shù)量急劇下降，這主要是因為收入中位數(shù)的大幅下降并非現(xiàn)實狀況的真正改善。這項措施并未將貧困兒童接受補助的質(zhì)量納入考慮范圍，這其中就包括教育和醫(yī)療。對于現(xiàn)金拮據(jù)的政府來說，更糟糕的是，他們必須花費巨資在稅務抵免和其他福利計劃上，才能將家庭收入高于貧困線。
But several charities are nervous about changing how poverty is defined and suspect MrDuncan Smith of trying to wriggle out of a commitment to his predecessors’ targets. Thesehad some benign effects. Since 1999, when Tony Blair announced his ambition to end childpoverty, the profile of the poor has changed profoundly. Thanks to tax credits, theproportion of children living in households below the poverty line has fallen by around a third.Pensioners, who have been supported since 2003 with a special credit, are now less likely to bein poverty than younger people. But working-age adults without children are actually worse off:whereas 12% were considered to be in poverty in 1997, now 15% are.
但是一些慈善組織對重新定義貧困深感不安，并且懷疑這是這是鄧肯·史密斯在逃避對其前任政府所定目標的承諾。那些目標還是有些積極地作用的。在1999年的時候，當托尼·布萊爾(Tony Blair)高調(diào)宣布，他將終結(jié)兒童貧困為己任，這一系列的措施讓貧困兒童的現(xiàn)狀發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化。由于稅收抵免，生活在貧困線之下兒童的比例較之前減少了1/3。自2003年以來領(lǐng)取養(yǎng)老金者便享受一項特殊津貼，相較于那些年輕人，他們受貧窮的可能性更低。但那些處于工作適齡卻沒有孩子的群體的經(jīng)濟狀況實際上惡化了：在1997年，他們中有12%的人生活在貧困線以下，而現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)達到了15%。
It is not clear that this progress will continue, says Chris Goulden, a researcher at the JosephRowntree Foundation. The government’s big welfare reform—the universal credit—createsstrong incentives for people to work for a few hours, which may help to increase incomes. Butother reforms work in the opposite direction. Mr Goulden reckons that child poverty willincrease significantly by 2020, mostly thanks to a change to how benefit rates are increasedwith inflation.
約瑟夫·朗特里基金會(Joseph Rowntree Foundation)的研究人員克里斯·戈爾登(Chris Goulden) 認為目前還不清楚的是，這項改進計劃是否會持續(xù)進行，而政府一項中較大的福利改革——全社會的稅收減免——極大地激勵了人們每周增加工作時間，將有利于增加他們的收入。但是其他的改革卻是與此背道而馳的。戈爾登認為，2020年兒童貧困將會大大的增加。這主要是因為即使福利保障水平會上漲，但是通貨膨脹水平也會不斷上升。
The long economic slump and the rising price of food and energy have already made life harderfor the very poorest. At a church in Brixton, in south London, desperate folk wait for parcelsof donated food. Many similar food banks have opened recently, mostly helping people in debt,or those whose benefits have been suspended. The church recently collected donations fromannual harvest festivals in schools. In the past, children collected food for the elderly, remarksthe vicar. Now they collect it for their classmates.
漫長的經(jīng)濟衰退時期以及糧食和能源價格的不斷上漲，使得貧困者的生活更加舉步維艱。在倫敦南部布里克斯頓(Brixton)的一座教堂里，無論可走的人們在等待人們捐贈的食物包裹 。而在近期，開放了許多類似的食物發(fā)放站，主要用來幫助那些負債累累或者救助金暫停發(fā)放的人們。而教堂近期的捐贈是從一年一度的校園收獲感恩節(jié)(harvest festivals)上募集來的。牧師稱，在過去，孩子們?yōu)槔先思夷季?。但是現(xiàn)在他們?yōu)樽约旱耐瑢W募捐。
長篇英語文章帶翻譯篇2
German politics
德國政治
When all parties lead to Angela
當所有政黨都傾向安吉拉的時候
Confusion reigns in Germany’s party politics. That may not affect who wins next year’selection
德國政壇仍疑云重重，但絲毫不影響明年大選的勝者
Less than a year before Germany’s federal election, Chancellor Angela Merkel is doing well, atleast at home. Her centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party,the Christian Social Union (CSU), are leading in the polls. Better still, the other parties aremaking news either for being in a shambles or, whenever for a moment they are not, forspeculation that they might join a coalition in which Mrs Merkel would be senior partner andthus remain as chancellor.
離德國聯(lián)邦大選還有不到一年的時間，但至少在國內(nèi)事務方面，安吉拉·默克爾做的很好。在民意調(diào)查中，她領(lǐng)導的中右__民主聯(lián)盟(CDU)和其巴伐利亞姊妹黨，基督__聯(lián)盟(CSD)占據(jù)了領(lǐng)先地位。好事成雙，有關(guān)其他政黨的新聞要么報道他們處于一片混亂，即使是當他們運行良好的時候，到處也都猜測他們將加入以默克爾為領(lǐng)導的聯(lián)合政黨，而她也將繼續(xù)出任德國。
Mrs Merkel’s biggest coup has been to remain personally unsullied by the otherwisedisappointing performance of the ruling coalition of the CDU and CSU with the smaller FreeDemocratic Party (FDP). The world might assume that German politics is given over to thecountry’s responsibility to save the euro. Instead, the CSU and FDP have spent most of theirpolitical energy on tactical projects that are either daft (for the CSU) or petty (the FDP).
盡管由__民主聯(lián)盟(CDU)和基督__聯(lián)盟(CSU)以及規(guī)模稍小的自由民主黨(FDP)組成的執(zhí)政聯(lián)盟在其他方面表現(xiàn)令人失望，但是默克爾始終保持個人清白，這是她最妙的招。全世界都認為德國政壇一直致力于履行本國對拯救歐元區(qū)的職責。相反，基督__聯(lián)盟(CSU)和自由民主黨(FDP)將他們大部分政治能量都花在他們那些愚蠢(CSU)和瑣碎(FDP)的戰(zhàn)術(shù)項目上。
This month, for example, the CSU tried to pander to Bavaria’s family-values voters by pushingthrough a new subsidy to parents who care for toddlers at home rather than sending them toa creche. Conveniently, the payments will begin next August, just before both the Bavarian andthe federal elections. Most parties, notably the FDP, see this policy as an expensive stepbackwards for a modern society that could leave children of poor families deprived of education.But the FDP accepted it in return for getting rid of a 10 (.6) fee that publicly insuredpatients have to pay once a quarter when they see their doctor.
舉個例子，本月__社會聯(lián)盟(CSU)推動了一項新的補貼措施，給在家照顧學步兒童而不是送他們到托兒所的父母提供津貼，以試圖迎合巴伐利亞重視家庭價值觀的選民。恰逢時宜的是，該補貼明年8月就開始發(fā)放，恰好在巴伐利亞大選和聯(lián)邦大選之前。以自由民主黨(FDP)為主的大部分政黨認為該政策是現(xiàn)代社會倒退的一步，其代價之昂貴可能會剝奪貧困家庭孩子的受教育機會。但是自由民主黨(FDP)還是接受了該政策，并作為回報減免了10歐元(12.6美元)的費用，這公開地保證了需每季度支付一次醫(yī)藥費的病人的生活。
That the FDP is reduced to horse-trading over such minutiae says a lot about the collapse ofthis once-grand liberal party. The polls suggest it may get less than 5% of votes in theelection, and would thus be ejected from the Bundestag. If an election in Lower Saxony inJanuary confirms such a poor showing, the FDP’s leader, Philipp Rosler (who is also economicsminister), will surely have to go. There are even rumours of a plot to oust him sooner.
自由民主黨(FDP)淪落到在這種細枝末節(jié)上討價還價，這很大程度上體現(xiàn)了這個曾今的偉大的自由政黨的淪陷。民意調(diào)查顯示其在大選中得到的選票不會超過5%，而且可能會因此被驅(qū)逐出聯(lián)邦議院。如果一月份下薩克森州進行的大選證實了這個糟糕的調(diào)查結(jié)果，那么FDP的領(lǐng)導人，菲利普·羅斯勒(他還是經(jīng)濟部長)，將不得不離職。甚至有傳言他們已經(jīng)在密謀立刻驅(qū)逐他。
With the coalition so preoccupied, the main opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) mighthave been expected to attack more effectively. That was the idea behind picking PeerSteinbruck, a famously sharp-tongued former finance minister, as the party’s candidate forchancellor. Mr Steinbruck has, however, become embroiled in a sustained debate about thespeaking fees he has been earning on the side (1.25m since 2009, the highest of anyBundestag member). Never loved by his party’s blue-collar and trade-union base, MrSteinbruck, the millionaire, may have turned off many of his erstwhile comrades completely.
由于聯(lián)合政府占據(jù)著顯著的主導地位，主要的反對派社會民主黨(SPD)可能需要采取更加有效的政治攻擊。一個幕后想法就是推選以言語犀利而著稱的前財政部長佩爾·施泰因布呂爾為該黨的候選人。然而，施泰因布呂爾卷入到一場有關(guān)他在位期間所得的高額演講費的持續(xù)辯論中(從2009年至今高達125萬歐元，德國聯(lián)邦議員中的最高值)。百萬富翁施泰因布呂爾先生從來沒有得到他所在黨派的藍領(lǐng)階層和工會基地的厚愛，他可能已經(jīng)完全失去了許多昔日同事的信任。
It is telling that the SPD chairman, Sigmar Gabriel, is continually having to parry questionsabout an election outcome in which the SPD would play second fiddle to Mrs Merkel in another“grand coalition”, like the one Germany had from 2005-09. Absolutely not, insist both Mr Gabrieland Mr Steinbruck, claiming that they overlap ideologically only with the Greens, the othercentre-left party. (The Left Party is still considered too toxic to touch, for it descends largelyfrom the old East German Communist Party, and it is anyway also struggling to stay inparliament.)
有消息稱大選結(jié)果將會產(chǎn)生另外一個和德國2005-09期間實行的非常相似的“大聯(lián)合政府”，而社會民主黨(SPD)將會充當默克爾的副手，關(guān)于該結(jié)果的問題層出不窮，社會民主黨(SPD)主席西格瑪爾·加布里爾不得不一直回避這些問題。絕不可能，加布里爾和施泰因布呂爾都堅決否認，他們聲稱他們的思想理念只和另一個中左黨派綠黨(the Greens)有異曲同工之妙。(左翼黨仍然被民眾認為是有害政黨而不愿涉及，因為其很大程度上起源于老派的東德共產(chǎn)黨，而且無論如何它也掙扎在議會的邊緣。)
The SPD is terrified whenever the Greens generate optimism for the wrong reason: theirsuitability as an alternative coalition partner for Mrs Merkel. The Greens have been on a rollsince capturing the mayorship of Stuttgart, capital of the rich south-western state of Baden-Wurttemberg, which is also the first and so far only state to be governed by a Green premier.Their success is credited to the dominance within the party’s southern branch of the “realo”wing: pragmatists who can appeal to ecologically minded but conservative urban voters.Such “bourgeois” Greens could get along fine with the CDU and CSU in Berlin, goes thethinking.
社會民主黨(SPD)無時無刻不擔心綠黨由于錯誤原因而過分樂觀：他們可以作為默克爾的備用的聯(lián)盟伙伴。自從奪得了斯圖加特市長的職位后，綠黨一直運行順暢。斯圖加特是德國南部富有的巴登-符騰堡州的首都，這也是綠黨控制的第一個也是到目前為止唯一一個州。他們的成功在于很好地控制了該黨南部的分支現(xiàn)實主義黨人：他們都是實用主義者，能夠吸引生態(tài)意識強烈但是保守的城市選民。進一步說，這些“資產(chǎn)階級”綠黨人士將會和柏林的__民主聯(lián)盟(CDU)和基督__聯(lián)盟(CSU)很好地相處。
As if to reinforce this impression, the Greens have just elected Katrin Goring-Eckardt, aleader in the Lutheran church who is from the east and is by Green standards a conservative,as their co-candidate for chancellor. (The other candidate, Jurgen , was almost preordained,for the Greens always pair a woman and a man.) Ms Goring-Eckardt’s selection was a rebuff toClaudia Roth, a flamboyant leftist. The choice immediately renewed speculation about an olivebranch to the CDU.
似乎是為了加強這種印象，綠黨剛剛選舉了卡特琳·格林-?？柕?lián)蔚穆?lián)合候選人。來自東部的卡特琳·格林-埃卡爾德是路德教會的領(lǐng)導人，按照綠黨標準，她是一個保守派。(另外一個候選人尤爾根·特利汀，這幾乎是內(nèi)定的，因為綠黨習慣于推選男女候選人各一名。)格林-?？柕碌娜脒x是對虛張聲勢的左派克勞迪婭·羅斯的有力回擊。這個選擇很快就被認為是向__民主聯(lián)盟(CDU)拋出的橄欖枝。
The relative decline of the traditional main parties, the CDU and SPD, in favour of smaller andyounger ones, explains much of this party manoeuvring. Some of these may just be fads. ThePirates have done well in four state elections but now seem to be self-destructing, unable toform basic policy and being generally tedious. Yet, as German society becomes moreindividualistic, says Oskar Niedermayer, a professor at Berlin’s Free University, traditional partystructures based on interest groups (Catholics, say, or trade unionists) lose appeal, leavingallegiances in flux.
傳統(tǒng)的重要黨派(如CDU和SPD)的相對衰落，規(guī)模較小和年輕的黨派逐漸獲得支持，這很大程度上解釋了這個政黨運作。有些政黨只是一時潮流。海盜黨(The Pirates)在4個州的選舉中表現(xiàn)得相當出色，但是現(xiàn)在他們似乎已經(jīng)要自我毀滅了，他們無法形成基本方針，而且非常單一。然而，隨著德國社會越來越個人主義化，傳統(tǒng)的建立在利益集團(天主教徒或工會主義者)之上的政黨結(jié)構(gòu)已經(jīng)失去了吸引力，這使得民眾的忠誠飄忽不定，柏林自由大學的教授奧斯卡·尼德邁爾說道。
At the same time and despite the campaign rhetoric, the differences between the main partieshave, he thinks, got smaller, making any radical change of direction unlikely. That is especiallytrue next year, since it seems increasingly likely that Mrs Merkel, with her safe pair of hands, willcontinue as chancellor. Only her coalition partner remains to be chosen.
同時，他認為，盡管在這個時候競選高調(diào)四起，主要政黨之間的區(qū)別卻已經(jīng)變得越來越小，他們也不可能給大選方向帶來巨變。這個現(xiàn)象在明年格外如此，因為越來越多的現(xiàn)象表明擁有放心的幫手的默克爾將連任德國。而等待我們選擇的只有她的聯(lián)合政黨的伙伴。
長篇英語文章帶翻譯篇3
The time-bomb at the heart of Europe
歐洲中心的定時炸彈
Why France could become the biggest danger to Europe’s single currency
為什么法國會成為歐洲單一貨幣體系的最大危機
The threat of the euro’s collapse has abated for the moment, but putting the single currencyright will involve years of pain. The pressure for reform and budget cuts is fiercest in Greece,Portugal, Spain and Italy, which all saw mass strikes and clashes with police this week. Butahead looms a bigger problem that could dwarf any of these: France.
歐盟瓦解的威脅日益減少，但是實行單一貨幣政策所帶來的痛楚會持續(xù)數(shù)年。對于希臘來說來自于改革和財政預算赤字的壓力是非常大的。葡萄牙，西班牙和意大利本周都發(fā)生了大規(guī)模的游行示威活動。但是擺在面前的還有一個更大的問題：法國。
The country has always been at the heart of the euro, as of the European Union. PresidentFrancois Mitterrand argued for the single currency because he hoped to bolster Frenchinfluence in an EU that would otherwise fall under the sway of a unified Germany. France hasgained from the euro: it is borrowing at record low rates and has avoided the troubles of theMediterranean. Yet even before May, when Francois Hollande became the country’s first Socialistpresident since Mitterrand, France had ceded leadership in the euro crisis to Germany. And nowits economy looks increasingly vulnerable as well.
法國這個國家是歐洲，也是歐盟的中心。弗朗索瓦·密特朗表示支持單一貨幣政策因為他希望提高法國在歐盟的影響，否則遲早會敗于統(tǒng)一后的德國手里。法國已經(jīng)從歐盟得到了甜頭：它以相對低的利率從而成功規(guī)避了地中海地區(qū)的問題。即使在五月之前，當奧朗德成為自密特朗，這位轉(zhuǎn)讓了法國在歐盟經(jīng)濟危機的主導權(quán)給德國的總統(tǒng)后，法國的第一位社會黨總統(tǒng)。法國的經(jīng)濟體系已經(jīng)相當脆弱了。
As our special report in this issue explains, France still has many strengths, but its weaknesseshave been laid bare by the euro crisis. For years it has been losing competitiveness toGermany and the trend has accelerated as the Germans have cut costs and pushed throughbig reforms. Without the option of currency devaluation, France has resorted to publicspending and debt. Even as other EU countries have curbed the reach of the state, it hasgrown in France to consume almost 57% of GDP, the highest share in the euro zone. Becauseof the failure to balance a single budget since 1981, public debt has risen from 22% of GDPthen to over 90% now.
就像我們的特別報道中提到的，法國仍然具有很大實力，但是其脆弱的部分在歐盟危機中已經(jīng)體現(xiàn)無疑。法國在近年來與德國的競爭中已經(jīng)逐漸失去了力量，特別是當?shù)聡_始減少開支和進行大的改革后。沒有歐元貶值的機遇，法國已經(jīng)踏上不得不向求助于公共開支和貸款的道路了。即使想其他歐盟國家一樣努力的避免走上這條路，仍避免不了其越來越高的GDP消耗--- GDP的消耗已經(jīng)高達57%，高于其他歐盟區(qū)國家。因為從1981年起，由于其對于單一預算的失誤，公共債務已經(jīng)從GDP的22%上升到了如今的90%。
The business climate in France has also worsened. French firms are burdened by overly rigidlabour- and product-market regulation, exceptionally high taxes and the euro zone’sheaviest social charges on payrolls. Not surprisingly, new companies are rare. France has fewersmall and medium-sized enterprises, today’s engines of job growth, than Germany, Italy orBritain. The economy is stagnant, may tip into recession this quarter and will barely grow nextyear. Over 10% of the workforce, and over 25% of the young, are jobless. The externalcurrent-account deficit has swung from a small surplus in 1999 into one of the euro zone’sbiggest deficits. In short, too many of France’s firms are uncompetitive and the country’sbloated government is living beyond its means.
法國的商業(yè)氛圍也愈加的壞了。法國的公司承擔的巨大的勞工和市場的管理條例，特別是高額的稅收和歐盟區(qū)最高的社保支付。意料之中的，新公司非常的少。法國的中小型企業(yè)越來越少，其就業(yè)壓力也超過德國，意大利和英國。經(jīng)濟停滯不前，甚至在這個季度有所倒退，未來的增長率也是不被看好的。再者，法國將會有超過10%的勞動力，超過25%的年輕勞動力將會無工作可做。在外，現(xiàn)如今的財政狀況也令人堪憂，在1999年還小有剩余，如今卻成了整個歐盟地區(qū)的最大赤字國?？偟膩碚f，太多的法國公司沒有競爭力，其驕傲的政府也并未發(fā)揮出作用。
Hollande at bay Hollande
等待起航
With enough boldness and grit, Mr Hollande could now reform France. His party holds powerin the legislature and in almost all the regions. The left should be better able than the right topersuade the unions to accept change. Mr Hollande has acknowledged that France lackscompetitiveness. And, encouragingly, he has recently promised to implement many of thechanges recommended in a new report by Louis Gallois, a businessman, including reducing theburden of social charges on companies. The president wants to make the labour market moreflexible. This week he even talked of the excessive size of the state, promising to “do better,while spending less”.
有著足夠的勇氣和毅力，奧朗德先生可以開始振興法國了。他所在的政黨在滲入于司法界和各種區(qū)域。左派會比優(yōu)派更容易說服聯(lián)邦區(qū)接受改革。奧朗德先生已經(jīng)了解到法國缺乏競爭力。更加歌舞人心的是他最近承諾的實行一系列由路易高盧瓦提出的新提案，包括減少公司承擔的社保金。這說明，總統(tǒng)想要使勞動力市場更加的活躍。這周他甚至提出要改變現(xiàn)在的狀況，承諾“花費最少，做的更好”。
Yet set against the gravity of France’s economic problems, Mr Hollande still seems half-hearted.Why should business believe him when he has already pushed through a string of leftishmeasures, including a 75% top income-tax rate, increased taxes on companies, wealth, capitalgains and dividends, a higher minimum wage and a partial rollback of a previously acceptedrise in the pension age? No wonder so many would-be entrepreneurs are talking of leaving thecountry.
然而面對法國嚴重的經(jīng)濟問題。奧朗德先生顯得力不從心。當他已經(jīng)開始推行一系列左派的措施，包括最高75%的收入稅率，增長公司，財產(chǎn)，資本收入和紅利的稅收，更高的最低工資，和降低部分之前已經(jīng)升高的最低退休年齡時，這些措施使商界更難以相信他。因此，越來越多的企業(yè)家選擇離開這個國家。
European governments that have undertaken big reforms have done so because there was adeep sense of crisis, because voters believed there was no alternative and because politicalleaders had the conviction that change was unavoidable. None of this describes Mr Hollandeor France. During the election campaign, Mr Hollande barely mentioned the need for business-friendly reform, focusing instead on ending austerity. His Socialist Party remains unmodernisedand hostile to capitalism: since he began to warn about France’s competitiveness, hisapproval rating has plunged. Worse, France is aiming at a moving target. All euro-zonecountries are making structural reforms, and mostly faster and more extensively than France isdoing (see article). The IMF recently warned that France risks being left behind by Italy andSpain.
歐盟政府承諾的大改革已經(jīng)開始，因為存在的深切的金融危機感，因為投票者相信已經(jīng)沒有選擇，因為執(zhí)政者們相信改變是不可避免的了。盡管如此，以上任何一種都不能形容奧朗德先生和法國。在大選期間，奧朗德先生很少提到對于友好的商業(yè)改革的需要，而是更加關(guān)注于結(jié)束緊縮。他所在的政黨始終保持保守態(tài)度，對于資本化持有敵意：自從他提出關(guān)于法國競爭力的問題，他的支持率便開始跳水。更加糟糕的是，法國的目標一直在變動。所有歐元區(qū)的國家都開始實施框架上的改革，并且相對法國來所更快且集中。國際貨幣基金組織最近警告說法國的危機已經(jīng)高于意大利和西班牙。
At stake is not just the future of France, but that of the euro. Mr Hollande has correctlybadgered Angela Merkel for pushing austerity too hard. But he has hidden behind his napkinwhen it comes to the political integration needed to solve the euro crisis. There has to begreater European-level control over national economic policies. France has reluctantly ratifiedthe recent fiscal compact, which gives Brussels extra budgetary powers. But neither the elitenor the voters are yet prepared to transfer more sovereignty, just as they are unprepared fordeep structural reforms. While most countries discuss how much sovereignty they will have togive up, France is resolutely avoiding any debate on the future of Europe. Mr Hollande wasbadly burned in 2005 when voters rejected the EU constitutional treaty after his party splitdown the middle. A repeat of that would pitch the single currency into chaos.
危險的并不只是法國的未來，同樣也是歐盟的未來。因為推行緊縮的難度，奧德朗先生正確的糾正了安格拉·默克爾的問題。但是當面對解決歐盟債務危機的政治整合問題時，他又躲了起來。整個歐盟區(qū)的調(diào)控不得不高于國家的經(jīng)濟政策。法國勉強同意了最近的政府財政條約，這給了Brussels額外的預算上的優(yōu)勢。但是無論是精英還是投票者都對主權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移沒有準備，就如他們對結(jié)構(gòu)改革沒有準備一樣。當大多數(shù)國家在討論他們會給出多大的主權(quán)讓步時，法國堅定的拒絕關(guān)于歐盟未來的討論。奧朗德先生被惹火上身在2005年當投票者拒絕歐盟的憲法條約時也是他所在政黨分裂之后。這樣的重復也會使單一貨幣政策陷入混亂。
Too big not to succeed?
太大不利于成功?
Our most recent special report on a big European country (in June 2011) focused on Italy’sfailure to reform under Silvio Berlusconi; by the end of the year he was out—and change hadbegun. So far investors have been indulgent of France; indeed, long-term interest rates havefallen a bit. But sooner or later the centime will drop. You cannot defy economics for long.
我們最近的關(guān)于歐洲國家的特別報道集中在西爾維奧·貝盧斯科尼領(lǐng)導下的意大利的不支持改革上。在年末的時候他出局了，改革得以開始。至今為止，投資者都太嬌慣法國了，因此長期利率只跌了一點。但是，遲早生丁會貶值。因為，沒有人可以長時間的違背經(jīng)濟規(guī)律。
Unless Mr Hollande shows that he is genuinely committed to changing the path his country hasbeen on for the past 30 years, France will lose the faith of investors—and of Germany. Asseveral euro-zone countries have found, sentiment in the markets can shift quickly. The crisiscould hit as early as next year. Previous European currency upheavals have often startedelsewhere only to finish by engulfing France—and this time, too, France rather than Italy orSpain could be where the euro’s fate is decided. Mr Hollande does not have long to defuse thetime-bomb at the heart of Europe.
除非奧朗德先生表示他真誠的承諾改變他的國家堅持了30年的道路，不然法國將會使投資者和德國失去信心。正如一些歐元區(qū)的國家已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)的，市場的敏感度時在快速變化的。危機可能會在明年早期就到來。之前的已經(jīng)發(fā)生在其他地區(qū)的歐元的巨大變動同樣會吞沒法國。法國會超過意大利和西班牙決定歐盟的滅亡。奧朗德先生已經(jīng)沒有多少時間拆除這個在歐洲中心的定時炸彈了。
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