巴菲特經(jīng)典語錄英文

　　被譽為股神的沃倫·巴菲特(Warren Buffett)，美國投資家、企業(yè)家、慈善家，從事股票、電子現(xiàn)貨、基金行業(yè)。看看股神的經(jīng)典語錄。

　　巴菲特經(jīng)典語錄英文

　　“Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime it's too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That judgment became ever more compelling as Berkshire's capital mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted a strategy that required our being smart - and not too smart at that - only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one good idea a year.” “The fact that people will be full of greed, fear or folly is predictable. The sequence is not predictable.”

　　――Warren Buffett, Financial Review, 1985

　　“I am out of step with present conditions. When the game is no longer played your way, it is only human to say the new approach is all wrong, bound to lead to trouble, and so on. On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand ( although I find it difficult to apply ) even though it may mean foregoing large, and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don't fully understand, have not practiced successfully, and which possibly could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital.”

　　――Warren Buffett in a letter to his partners in the stock market frenzy of 1969.

　　“We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also from grown-ups who behave in the market like children.” “The key to investing is not assessing how much an industry is going to affect society, or how much it will grow, but rather determining the competitive advantage of any given company and, above all, the durability of that advantage.”

　　――July 1999 at Herb Allen's Sun Valley, Idaho Retreat

　　“I will tell you how to become rich. Close the doors. Be fearful when others are greedy. Be greedy when others are fearful.”

　　――Warren Buffett lecturing to a group of students at Columbia U

　　“There are all kinds of businesses that Charlie and I don't understand, but that doesn't cause us to stay up at night. It just means we go on to the next one, and that's what the individual investor should do.”

　　――Warren Buffett in a Morning star Interview

　　“If you're an investor, you're looking on what the asset is going to do, if you're a speculator, you're commonly focusing on what the price of the object is going to do, and that's not our game.”

　　――1997 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

　　“It is our job to help our clients be fearful when others are greedy, and look at opportunities when others are fearful.” “If you understood a business perfectly and the future of the business, you would need very little in the way of a margin of safety. So, the more vulnerable the business is, assuming you still want to invest in it, the larger margin of safety you'd need. If you're driving a truck across a bridge that says it holds 10,000 pounds and you've got a 9,800 pound vehicle, if the bridge is 6 inches above the crevice it covers, you may feel okay, but if it's over the Grand Canyon, you may feel you want a little larger margin of safety...”

　　――1997 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

　　“You pay a high price for a cheery consensus.” “If you understood a business perfectly and the future of the business, you would need very little in the way of a margin of safety. So, the more vulnerable the business is, assuming you still want to invest in it, the larger margin of safety you'd need. If you're driving a truck across a bridge that says it holds 10,000 pounds and you've got a 9,800 pound vehicle, if the bridge is 6 inches above the crevice it covers, you may feel okay, but if it's over the Grand Canyon, you may feel you want a little larger margin of safety...”

　　――1997 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting

　　巴菲特經(jīng)典語錄中英文

　　“What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don't know. An investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes.”

　　就投資而言，人們應(yīng)該注意的，不是他到底知道多少，而是應(yīng)該注意自己到底有多少是不知道的，投資人不需要花太多時間去做對的事，只要他能夠盡量避免去犯重大的錯誤。

　　――1992 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

　　“Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining himself to a relatively few，easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment risks with a useful degree of accuracy.”

　　當然每個投資人都會犯錯，但只要將自己集中在相對少數(shù)，容易了解的投資個案上，一個理性、知性與耐性兼具的投資人一定能夠?qū)⑼顿Y風險限定在可接受的范圍之內(nèi)。

　　――1993 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

　　“When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn- more- by-putting-up-more record is no great managerial achievement. You can get the same result personally while operating from your rocking chair. just quadruple the capital you commit to a savings account and you will quadruple your earnings. You would hardly expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet,

　　retirement announcements regularly sing the praises of CEOs who have, say, quadrupled earnings of their widget company during their reign - with no one examining whether this gain was attributable simply to many years of retained earnings and the workings of compound interest.”

　　當資本報酬率平平，這種大堆頭式的賺錢方式跟本沒什么了不起，你坐在搖椅上也能輕松達到這樣的成績，好比只要把你存在銀行戶頭里的錢，一樣可以賺到加倍的利息，沒有人會對這樣的成果報以掌聲，但通常我們在某位資深主管的退休儀式上歌頌他在任內(nèi)將公司的盈余數(shù)字提高數(shù)倍，卻一點也不會去看看這些事實上是因為公司每年所累積盈余與復利所產(chǎn)生的效果。

　　――1985 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders

　　“We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with results that have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn't turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.”

　　我們曾用劃算的價錢買下不少蟾蜍，過去的報告多已提及，很明顯的我們的吻表現(xiàn)平平，我們有遇到幾個王子級的公司，但是早在我們買下時他們就已是王子了，而至少我們的吻沒讓他們變回蟾蜍，而最后我們偶爾也曾成功地以蟾蜍般的價格買到部份王子級公司的部份股權(quán)。

　　――1981 Chairman's Letters to Shareholders

　　“First, many in Wall Street - a community in which quality control is not prized - will sell investors anything they will buy.”

　　第一課，不論是什么東西，只要有人要買，華爾街那幫人都會想辦法弄來賣給你。

　　――2000 Letter to Shareholders

　　“The most common cause of low prices is pessimism-some times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment, not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.”

　　股價不振最主要的原因是悲觀的情緒，有時是全面性的，有時則僅限于部份產(chǎn)業(yè)或是公司，我們很期望能夠在這種環(huán)境下做生意，不是因為我們天生喜歡悲觀，而是如此可以得到便宜的價格買進更多好的公司，樂觀是理性投資人最大的敵人。 ――1990 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders

　　“Ben’s Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today's investment world, in which most professionals and academicians talk of efficient markets,

　　dynamic hedging and betas. Their interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising 'Take two aspirins'?”

　　葛拉漢的市場先生理論在現(xiàn)今的投資世界內(nèi)或許顯得有些過時，尤其是在那些大談市場效率理論、動態(tài)避險與beta值的專家學者眼中更是如此，他們會對那些深奧的課題感到興趣是可以理解的，因為這對于渴望投資建議的追求者來說，是相當具吸引力的，就像是沒有一位名醫(yī)可以單靠「吃兩顆阿斯匹寧」這類簡單有效的建議成名致富的。

　　――1987 Chairman's Letter to Shareholders

　　“John Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing investor matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business associate, F. C. Scott, on August 15, 1934 that says it all: As time goes on，I get more and more

　　convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence… One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or

　　three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence.”

　　著名經(jīng)濟學家凱因斯，他的投資績效跟他的理論思想一樣杰出，在1934年8月15日他曾經(jīng)寫了一封信給生意伙伴Scott上面寫到，隨著時光的流逝，我越來越相信正確的投資方式是將大部分的資金投入在自己認為了解且相信的事業(yè)之上，而不是將資金分散到自己不懂且沒有特別信心的一大堆公司，每個人的知識與經(jīng)驗一定有其限度，就我本身而言，我很難同時有兩三家以上的公司可以讓我感到完全的放心。

　　――1991 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

　　“I would rather be certain of a good result than hopeful of a great one.”

　　但與其兩鳥在林，還不如一鳥在手。

　　――1996 Letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders

　　“The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities - that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future - will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy

　　participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There's a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.”

　　投資與投機之間永遠是一線之隔，尤其是當所有市場的參與者都沉浸在歡愉的氣氛當中時更是如此，再也沒有比大筆不勞而獲的金錢更讓人失去理性，在經(jīng)歷過這類經(jīng)驗之后，再正常的人也會像參加舞會的灰姑娘一樣被沖昏了頭，他們明知在舞會中多待一會-也就是繼續(xù)將大筆的資金投入到投機的活動之上，南瓜馬車與老鼠駕駛現(xiàn)出原形的機率就越高，但他們還是舍不得錯過這場盛大舞會的任何一分鐘，所有人都打算繼續(xù)待到最后一刻才離開，但問題是這場舞會中的時鐘根本就沒有指針!